SHORT INTEREST; SP 500 FINANCIAL & OTHERS

Algunas notas para leer de The Bespoke Investment Group.


NYSE Short Interest Back Near Record Highs

Last night after the close, short interest figures for the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) were released and showed that short sales as of May 15th rose 2.34% since the end of April. Even though the S&P 500 closed at its highest level since January, short bets remain near all-time highs. This is in contrast to October when short interest was declining leading up to the market's peak, and indicates that many investors are skeptical of the current rally.

The table below lists the twenty non-Nasdaq stocks in the S&P 500 (Nasdaq short interest figures will be released on May 27th.) with the highest short interest as a percentage of float. Like last month, Consumer Discretionary and Financial stocks are well represented on the list of stocks most heavily shorted. The list of stocks on the list of least shorted come from various sectors. In fact, eight of the ten sectors are represented on this list (no Materials or Consumer Discretionary).

Financials Back to Oversold

After briefly moving into overbought territory earlier in the month, the S&P 500 Financial sector has moved to the bottom of its trading range once again. The short-term uptrend that formed off the March lows has also been broken, so the sector is now trending sideways until it takes out its recent highs or lows. Breadth has also gotten weak again. On May 1st, 85% of Financial stocks in the S&P 500 were trading above their 50-day moving averages. Currently, just a third of the stocks are above their 50-days. Hopefully the sector begins to stabilize at current levels and doesn't get back to the extreme oversold levels constantly seen over the past 9 months.

S&P 1500 Earnings Revisions

With the S&P 1500 poised to open lower this morning, the index will be trading down about 3% from its recent highs. When the week started, the market was trading at its highest levels since January, and things seemed good. Four days later, the mood has shifted 180 degrees. Suddenly, oil is going to $200 (Hey, Goldman Sachs said so), Lehman and the rest of the brokers are in trouble again (at least according to an investor who is short the stock), and Ford no longer expects to turn a profit in '09 (With the stock at $7 and change, did anyone really think Ford was close to turning a profit?).

While the news has been bleak, one positive trend that remains in place is analyst forecasts. We track the net number of analyst EPS revisions (positive revisions minus negative revisions) for stocks in the S&P 1500 on a daily basis. While revisions have been negative all year, since bottoming in January they have been consistently improving and currently stand at their highest levels of the year. Even during this week's sell-off, analyst revisions haven't budged. Admittedly, analysts have built a reputation of notoriously being late to the game in terms of lowering forecasts, but for now at least the individuals who supposedly follow these companies the closest are sticking by their forecasts.

Credit Crisis Indicators

In late March, we highlighted charts of a few credit crisis indicators. Below we have updated those charts, and by the looks of them, things remain much better than they did a couple of months ago.

The first chart measures default risk by looking at a credit default swap index of investment grade debt. While the index has ticked slightly higher this week as equity markets have sold off, the rise has been puny compared to the spikes seen earlier this year. The second chart looks at the national average of 30-year fixed mortgage rates. While it would be nice if rates were lower, they have remained stable and are not spiking like they were in January and February when banks demanded huge spreads to take on any risk whatsoever. The last chart tracks the municipal bond market through the MUB ETF of S&P's National Municipal Bond Index. Another problem during the credit crisis was the failure of Auction Rate Securities, which tanked muni bonds and sent their yields sharply higher. As shown by the price chart, muni bonds have come back nicely as investors became attracted to those high yields.

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PETROLEO: U$135 Y ¿SUBIENDO?

El petróleo sigue siendo noticia. La fuerte suba de los últimos días está replanteando las proyecciones de su precio para el resto del año. Otros esperan una corrección.
Mientras tanto mucho se sigue analizando como seguira el curso de este commodity.

A continuación transcribo el final de un artículo que salió en The Daily Reckoning (Last Dance for Oil by Chris Mayer), para quienes piensen que la suba esta cerca de su final, pero quieren obtener redito de la misma.

So the key takeaways here are these: The price of oil has room to run yet, in part because of the growth in money supply and in part because of pressing international demand. Secondly, even if we already saw oil peak, history says that prices won't retreat by much over the next several years. And finally, the capital spending boom by the big oil companies is just getting started, which is great news for investors in oil field services companies.

The big idea here is well servicing…

It's really a great and kind of sneaky way to play an undeniable trend in oil and gas: the depletion of older wells past their peak production. Well servicing helps you get a little extra out of every well. A well service rig is the workhorse that does the well servicing.

Here's the life cycle of a typical oil well…

Every time somebody drills a well, it creates an annuity for the well service industry. That's because the maintenance work follows the life span of a typical well. If you don't service your well, your production rate declines much more rapidly. So if you want to stay in business, you keep servicing your existing wells. You may not drill new ones, but you keep what you have.

The second key to remember is this: The more mature the oil or gas field, the more well servicing work needed. Well servicing doesn't typically have the same ups and downs as exploration. Well service fleets provide much more durable and predictable cash flows. I expect all that money the big majors spend on exploration will lead to a lot of new drills and a long tail of new business for well servicing companies.

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TERMINO LA CRISIS FINANCIERA AMERICANA III

Última entrega from Outside the Box

Food Price Inflation, Monetary Policy & Financial Markets

By David Kotok

Suddenly food price inflation has become the premier hot topic. The media is now attuned to food issues including emerging market country riots.

In the US, the politicians are gearing up to castigate the speculators and blame everyone but themselves. They conveniently forget that they are the ones who passed the ethanol subsidy and they are the ones who appropriate taxpayer money to pay farmers not to grow crops. And so the political circus begins.

Notice how the three presidential candidates are silent on how the US ethanol subsidy has caused a food price explosion in grains. They avoid the issue of US policy starving many in the world. 1 billion very poor people sustain themselves on $1 or less a day. We have doubled the cost of their food.

Ethanol directly impacted corn which, in turn, also drove up maize. In addition, the substitution of wheat and rice are not easily occurring because of crop issues and concomitant price inflation in those items.

Well Cumberland is in the financial market and money management business. We eat food. We don't grow it and we don't process it. So let's try to inject some serious monetary policy issues into this media hysteria and political cacophony.

In the mature countries, food is a minor portion of the price index. And some of the food costs originate from eating out and some come from food processing. Processed food cost is heavily dependent on the inputs which are non-food items. Labor, machinery, transportation and distribution all come in to play. So in the mature countries we see that the food price inflation may be topical and attention getting but it is not a crisis.

Also, the major mature countries are mostly in food surplus. In the US we are very efficient in running our agriculture enterprise. We actually pay farmers not to till their soil. This is dumb. It occurs only because of our sorrowful Congress who has learned how to bribe the farm belt for votes at the expense of the rest of us.

In the US food has a 14% weight in the consumer price index. Compare that with Canada at 17%, the Euro zone at 16%, England at 11% and Japan at 25%. Only Japan lacks the fullness of food self sufficiency. Sure, food price inflation is important. But it is not the most important issue in these major economies.

The reverse is true for the emerging markets. In some of them the food price component is as much as half the price index. In a few it is above half. Since many of these economies are open to some degree, the importation of food price inflation is hitting them particularly hard. Some are responding with tariff adjustments. Others have actually embargoed food exports. Of course they ultimately make matters worse when they restrict world trade and in the end all suffer because of this protectionism.

What about monetary policy?

Here is where it gets difficult. We will admittedly simplify now and we acknowledge to our critics that we know there are second order effects and are ignoring them to make our point. In our view, monetary policy cannot easily and directly address food price inflation when the source of the inflation is in the raw food commodity. This is also true for energy costs when the source is in the oil or natural gas. The whole concept of "core" inflation vs. total inflation originates in this notion that monetary policy should be directed at the price level changes it can affect.

Let's get to the inflation problem in an emerging economy. Our example is imaginary for simplicity's sake. But it reflects characteristics that are very similar to many countries and regions in the emerging markets of the world.

We developed this simple and theoretical case study and then sent it to a number of economist friends. We suggested that following facts: the economy in question is a small and open emerging market. The food price component is 50% of the price index and is inflating at 15%. The non-food component is inflating at 5%. Thus the overall index is inflating at 10%. In this small and open economy, the main items in the food component are based on maize; therefore, the US ethanol policy which has raised the corn priced has also pressured an increase in the maize price.

Suppose you are the governor of the central bank. You have to set your policy interest rate. Do you base that decision on overall inflation rate of 10% or on the core inflation rate of 5%? Or are you going to confront the food inflation rate of 15%. Let's further assume that your economy is growing at a trend rate of 5% and all other aspects are in trend or neutral position. You have no negative output gap and no above trend pressures. Your only direct problem is what to do about inflation.

My economist friends who answered offered a suggested policy rate as low as 6% and as high as 13.5%. The answers were about equally divided and the respondents sample size is over 20. The distribution of answers was distinctly bi-modal. About half the answers were bunched in the lower range of 6%-8%; the other half were in the double digit area between 11% and 13.5%.

The divided views centered on whether or not to target food, ignore food, or blend policy. No one wanted to set the interest rate above the 15% food price inflation. Nearly all acknowledged that this central bank would have difficulty in communicating whatever it decided. Most respondents worried about changes in inflation expectations because of the complexity of this issue. Most believed the citizens in the country would not understand the monetary policy dynamics that led to the decision.

Some worried that setting the policy interest rate in double digits would impose a very high financing cost on the non-food portion of the economy and cause it to go into recession. They argued that the real (inflation-adjusted) rate of interest for that non-food half of the economy would be 7% or so. That would set the threshold of finance too high.

Others argued that the monetary policy expectation effect would cause the rate of inflation to accelerate if the policy rate was not set in double digits. They were willing to take the recession in the non-food area in order to keep inflation expectations under control. No one mentioned substitution effects. Perhaps that was overlooked. Or it may be because rice and wheat are not easy cultural substitutes and those grains are each experiencing their own price pressures.

In sum, almost two dozen folks with some monetary economics expertise were equally divided on this technical question. It is a question that impacts billions of citizens in this world and many countries, their governments, their currencies and, possibly, their political stability.

We do not know the correct answer. Our view would support the lower interest rate and we would focus on the non-food portion of the economy but we can argue the other side with equal vigor. For us a lot would depend on how the food price inflation spreads into wages and if it could trigger a broader wage/price spiral.

In many respects this question is now being asked of the major and mature economy central banks as well. It appears that the European Central Bank (ECB) favors the higher mode while the US Federal Reserve is positioned in the lower one. For the emerging markets it appears that there is quite a mix of policy and that it is made more complicated by the management of each currency's foreign exchange rate. In sum, our simple case study is actually quite complex when applied in the real world.

David Kotok, the chief investment officer of Cumberland Asset Managers SEGUIR LEYENDO...

TERMINO LA CRISIS FINANCIERA AMERICANA II

Segunda entrega, from Outside the Box

Why This Crisis is Still Far From Finished

By Mohamed El-Erian

During the past few weeks we have seen a growing number of market participants predict an end to the dislocations that erupted last summer and claimed victims throughout the financial system and beyond. While their predictions are understandable, they are premature. The dynamics driving the disruptions are morphing and may again move ahead of both the market and policy responses.

The optimistic view is based on two distinct elements. First, that the de­leveraging process is reaching its natural end as valuations stabilize and institutions come clean about their losses and raise capital; second, that a series of previously unthinkable policy responses have been effective in restoring liquidity to the financial system.

Both views have merit. Financial institutions, particularly in the US, have recognized the scale of the problem and are taking remedial steps. Just witness the recent round of capital raising by Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, JPMorgan and Wachovia. At the same time central banks in Europe and the US have opened up their financing windows, expanding the size of the financing, the range of institutions that can access it and the list of eligible collateral.

Yet, consistent with what we have seen since last summer, the dislocations are entering a new phase. As such, bold reactions on the part of policymakers may, once again, prove to be too little and too late.

Persistent financial dislocations have now caused the real economy to become, in itself, a source of potential disruption. During the next few months there will be a reversal in the direction of causality: the unusual adverse contamination by the financial sector of the real economy is now morphing into the more common phenomenon of recessionary forces threatening to undermine the financial system.

Economic data in the US have taken a notable turn for the worse. Most im­portantly, the already weakening employment outlook is being further undermined by a widely diffused build-up in inventory and falling profitability. History suggests that the latter two factors lead to significant employment losses.

Pity the US consumers. Their ability to sustain spending is already challenged by the declining availability of credit, a negative wealth effect triggered by declining house values, and a lower standard of living as the result of higher energy and food prices and a depreciating dollar. Job losses will accentuate the pressures on consumers, leading to income declines and a further loss of confidence.

While the financial system has taken steps to enhance balance sheets, they speak essentially to addressing the consequences of excessive leveraging and imprudent financial alchemy. As such, the nasty turn in the real economy may fuel another wave of disruptions that, this time around, would also have an impact on mid-size and smaller banks.

It is thus too early to declare the end of the turmoil that started last summer. Instead, during the next few months we may witness a new phase of dislocations, led this time by the real economy. The blame game will intensify; political pressure will continue to mount; momentum will build for greater and broader regulation of financial activities within the banking system and beyond.

The focus will also be on the reaction of policymakers. Here the outlook is mixed. The good news is that the crisis is now moving to an area where traditional policy tools are more effective. This is in sharp contrast to the situation of the past few months, where central banks were forced to use instruments that were too blunt for the purpose at hand.

But there is also bad news. The sharp slowdown in the US real economy will occur in the context of continued global inflationary pressures. As such, the Federal Reserve's dual objectives - maintaining price stability and solid economic growth - will become increasingly inconsistent and difficult to reconcile. Indeed, if the Fed is again forced to carry the bulk of the burden of the US policy response, it will find itself in the unpleasant and undesirable situation of potentially undermining its inflation-fighting credibility in order to prevent an already bad situation from becoming even worse.

It is still too early for investors and policymakers to unfasten their seatbelts. Instead, they should prepare for renewed volatility.

Mohamed El-Erian, the co-chief executive and co-chief investment officer of Pimco SEGUIR LEYENDO...